DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 275 013 CS 505 379

AUTHOR Couvillion, Marion; Powell, Larry
TITLE The Campaign Consultant as Rhetor: A Case Study.
PUB DATE May 86
NOTE 25p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association (36th, Chicago, IL, May 22-26, 1986).
PUB TYPE Reports - Research/Technical (143) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Case Studies; *Consultants; *Models; *Political Campaigns; Political Candidates; Rhetoric; Speech Communication
IDENTIFIERS *Rhetorical Strategies

ABSTRACT

A case study examined the political campaign consultants' role as rhetor by analyzing consultant Robert Squier's strategy for Mike Sturdivant's 1983 Mississippi gubernatorial campaign. The examination compared Squier's ideal model (a "single vision" strategy) with a second model drawn from empirical data. Squier's strategy for the campaign, using the theme "businessman versus politicians," involved three stages: foundation, competency, and issue development, while the empirical model had four stages: legitimacy, identification, competency, and issue development. The study found three major principles relevant to the role of the political consultant as rhetor: legitimacy, maintenance of the media agenda, and development of the consultant's work as a campaign issue. Future studies need to differentiate between identification and definition roles of the consultants' expressive function in message construction. (JK)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

X This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

THE CAMPAIGN CONSULTANT AS RHETOR: A CASE STUDY

ED275013

By

Marion Couvillion

and

Larry Powell

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Larry Powell

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Marion Couvillion is an Instructor and Larry Powell is a Professor in the Department of Communication at Mississippi State University.

CS 505 379

ABSTRACT

THE CAMPAIGN CONSULTANT AS RHETOR: A CASE STUDY

This study analyzed the political campaign consultant's role as rhetor by examining consultant Robert Squier's strategy for the 1983 Mississippi gubernatorial campaign of Mike Sturdivant. The analysis used an ideal model to identify discrepancies between strategies and implementation of those strategies. The analysis leads to a discussion of the consultant's role in providing campaign legitimacy, maintenance of media agenda, and development of the consultant's work as a campaign issue. Suggestions are made for future studies to differentiate between the identification and definition roles of the consultant's expressive function in message construction.

THE CAMPAIGN CONSULTANT AS RHETOR: A CASE STUDY

Contemporary political rhetoric has looked at a variety of campaign variables ranging from advertising techniques[1] to distaff campaigning.[2] Consistent with these approaches have been studies analyzing specific campaign strategies.[3] Such studies serve a descriptive and analytical function, enabling a researcher to gain insight into the goals and techniques of the campaign as a persuasive effort. However, few communication studies have adequately examined the function of political consultants and their role in the rhetorical development of a campaign.

Political consultants have become an essential part of the campaign process in major electoral races.[4] Their services include polling, media advising, research, and strategy development.[5] The field has become so involved in campaigns that many authorities now view the consultant's role as crucial to the rhetorical effectiveness of the campaign. As Agranoff said, "The outcome of any race depends, in increasing measure, on the quality of the candidates organization and campaign style, as well as the way the campaign is managed."[6] However, despite the influence of these campaign professionals, there has been little academic effort to study their rhetorical strategies or techniques. Thus Agranoff noted, "Little progress has been made toward developing a proven, systematic body of knowledge in the campaign management field."[7]

One consultant who has been effective in strategy development is Robert Squier, president of the Communications Company. His clients have included Hubert Humphrey, Edmund Muskie, Birch Bayh, John Y. Brown, and a host of other senatorial, congressional, and

gubernatorial candidates.[8] During one stretch, Squier's clients were successful in 24 out of 25 campaigns.[9]

Squier provides his clients both media production and strategic advice. Thus he is representative of consultants who heavily influence the strategic decisions of a campaign. As he says, "I don't think you can be successful just making (TV) spots. You have to be part of the whole process, from the design of the total campaign strategy to the execution of a series of campaign tactics...."[10] He considers this element of strategy participation as a professional requirement. "Before we become involved in or sign on to a campaign, we have a requirement that I become a full partner in whatever top strategy committee there is. That gives me a voice there, and also gives me an opportunity to try to influence how the general strategy of the campaign is going to shape up."[11]

Given Squier's involvement in strategy development, an analysis of his approach to campaigns can provide insights into the role of consultants as rhetors. This study analyzed Squier's involvement in one specific campaign--the 1983 Mississippi gubernatorial primary campaign of Mike Sturdivant. In one instance, the election was not representative of Squier's campaigns in that it was one of the few times that his candidate was unsuccessful. However, despite this limitation, the campaign is representative of Squier's communicative intent and tactics. Further, the lack of success of the campaign provided an opportunity to analyze Squier's strategies by using an ideal model analysis without post hoc credit for their success.

Hickson provides an approach for analyzing the effectiveness of a communication effort by using such an ideal model as a basis for comparison.[12] In this approach, the ideal model serves as the criterion for effectiveness. The analysis is conducted by comparing the ideal model with the second model drawn from empirical data. For the purposes of this study, this analysis required a three step process: (1) identification of Squier's ideal model, (2) application of this model to the Sturdivant campaign, and (3) identification of the empirical model for the Sturdivant campaign. Through this process, this study will attempt to provide one case study of the campaign consultant's role as a campaign rhetor.

SQUIER'S IDEAL MODEL

Squier's ideal model might best be described as a "single vision" strategy. He says, "You've got to have a single vision and one person who decides what is to be done and then does it.... So when you begin to execute the communication of the campaign..., the whole thing has a kind of single purpose and focus."[12] In developing this single vision, Squier usually follows a simple three step developmental model--an opening statement, a middle, and an end.[13] Squier says, "you must be very aware of having an opening statement, a middle part--several middle parts sometimes--and of developing the story of your candidate over a period of time...."[14]

Within these three stages, two communicative goals are perceived as important--interest and theme development.[15] He sees the two elements as interrelated. "The most terrible thing you can do

in a campaign is to bore the voter to death," Squier has said.[16] And he added, "the one style of communication that is the least successful is the monotone."[17]

To avoid this monotone, Squier recommends using multiple messages developed over the duration of the campaign. "You must keep your campaign fresh," (and) "try to keep the campaign as relevant to as many people as possible."[18] Implementation of this element is achieved through the use of multiple campaign ads, an element that Squier considers a campaign necessity. "When you bore them (voters) with the repetition of the same material or the same tone, people respond by saying 'You don't respect my judgment.'[19]

One by-product of this assumption is the use of multiple ads to an extent that some critics find excessive. For example, in Squier's successful campaign for New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg (defeating the favored Republican Millicent Fenwick), Squier used 32 different TV spots (Fenwick only used 12 different).[20] But Squier rejects the criticism as applicable to product advertising, but not to candidate campaigning. "There are many people who say we do too many spots, and as a result, we violate all the principles of product advertising. And to these detractors I say, 'You are absolutely right.'"[21]

Despite the multiple ads, Squier also believes that the "single vision" requirement must be met. Thus, while new ads are constantly being used in a campaign, consistency is also sought. "You have to make sure all of it makes sense relative to the other parts," he says.[22] Thus Squier's developmental stages must have both consistency and variation. On this point, he agrees with

Larson's musical analogy that effective campaigns must have both rhythm (repetition) and melody (variation).[23]

BACKGROUND

Mike Sturdivant, the candidate, was described in his opening press release as a "Glendora businessman."[24] He was a 56 year-old Mississippian, educated at Mississippi State University and Harvard Business School, who operated a farming operation and headed a management corporation operating thirteen southeastern hotels. He had served on a county school board, on the State Board of Institutions of Higher Learning, and was currently on the Board of Trustees of Millsaps College. Sturdivant had never held an elective office and had never before run for public office.

A major competitor in the primary race was Lieutenant Governor Evelyn Gandy, who had amassed an average of more than 300,000 votes in five other democratic races where she had opposition.[25] Gandy, under the campaign supervision of consultant, Ray Strother, ran a campaign suggesting she was trying to shake the stereotypic image of a weak female. Gandy's thirty years of political experience far surpassed that of any other candidate, and she was viewed as one who could direct the state without turmoil and anger.[26]

A second major competitor was Attorney General Bill Allain. Allain, assistant attorney general for thirteen years, and attorney general for four, sought to emphasize his role as consumer advocate and champion of the little man at the mercy of big business during perilous economic times. Allain's political consultant was Dick Morris.

IDEAL MODEL: THE STURDIVANT CAMPAIGN

Although Squier utilizes three stages in his model, he does not believe that it has universal applicability. Instead, each campaign should have a strategy especially tailored for it. Thus he noted "...you should approach every single campaign and situation in a new and fresh fashion."[27] Each strategy is dependent upon the personal characteristics of the particular candidate. "You should try to find out what makes you candidate tick, what issues the voting population wants to hear about, what kinds of qualities they're looking for before deciding on a candidate," Squier says, "Then go ahead and project that on the screen as best you can..."[28]

This procedure was used in the development of the campaign strategy for Mike Sturdivant. Although he had been active in state and local politics, Sturdivant was relatively unknown to most of the voting public, and his benchmark poll indicated a name identification rating of less than ten percent.[29] Squier's plan for the Sturdivant campaign was operationalized as a "businessman versus politicians" argument, i.e., "the politicians have had their chance and they have not succeeded; it's time to elect a businessman who knows how to manage large companies."[30] The communication of this message used the predescribed three stage program to develop the theme. For Sturdivant, these stages could be defined as (1) foundation (beginning), (2) competency (middle), and (3) issue development (end).

Foundation. The first stage of Squier's TV campaign was described by him as "laying a foundation."[31] Its intent was to

introduce the candidate to the voting public while achieving two functions: (1) expand the name identification of the candidate to a broader segment of the voting population, and (2) establish Sturdivant's legitimacy as a viable voting alternative for the public. In addition, the early ads were to provide the foundation for the theme of the campaign--Sturdivant as a businessman who could handle big problems.

To achieve these goals, Squier planned a three step procedure. First, there would be extensive airings of TV ads, with some broadcasts starting in April 1983, a month earlier than the other candidates were to begin their commercials. Second, after use of the initial ads, there would be a series of press conferences in which Sturdivant would officially announce his candidacy for governor. Third, the official announcement would be followed by another series of TV ads aimed at providing further introduction of the candidate and his themes to the voters.

Competency. Following the completion of the foundation stage, the campaign strategy called for a three week period aimed at demonstrating Sturdivant's competency at handling the position of Governor. This would involve a series of week long campaigns demonstrating Sturdivant's expertise on a series of issues. The format of each week was to follow the same pattern: (1) a series of statewide press conferences where Sturdivant would release a manuscript/book delineating his position and proposed plans related to a specific category of issues, (2) a week long TV ad campaign which would highlight key points of the plan and an invitation to write for a copy of the plan; and (3) distribution of the

manuscripts to all media sources. The first week would be devoted to the economy and would use a 31-page booklet, A Jobs Plan for Mississippi.[32] The second week would focus on Education with a 23-page booklet Education in Mississippi.[33] Miscellaneous issues would be addressed the third week with the release of a paperback autobiography, Mississippi on the Move.[34]

The primary goal of this stage would be to present an image of competency by demonstrating that the candidate knew more about, and had specific plans and programs for, each issue discussed. The voter assumptions at this stage followed Shadegg's delineation of "Indifferents" who respond to strategies which make "it easy for them to reach a decision."[35] By a heavy focus on issues, plans and programs, the intent was to separate the candidate from the other in terms of competency to handle the issues.

Issue Development. The final stage, issue development, was to cover the last three weeks of the campaign, and it lacked the specifics of advanced planning which characterized the first two stages. As campaign manager Hal Malchow said, "We will wait until we see how the campaign goes, and what the polls say, before we decide what to do."[36] Squier, speaking in general terms about this approach, advocated adjustments made upon the basis of polling, and "upon the kinds of questions that you can get a poll to ask the electorate."[37] Regardless, the rhetorical intent of this stage was to meet Squier's goal of campaign development, i.e., developing the story of your candidacy over a period of time.[38]

The tactic for implementation of this stage was to be "fresh" TV spots, i.e., ads addressing the campaign messages, but adding

information that had not been previously seen by the voters. This particular segment of the strategy has drawn Squier the most criticism for using too many ads.

THE STURDIVANT EMPIRICAL MODEL

While the Sturdivant Ideal model employed a three stage developmental process (foundation, competency, and issue) the empirical model was divided into four distinct stages, focusing on legitimacy and identification separately.

Legitimacy. In contrast to the ideal model, which viewed legitimacy and identification as dual goals of the foundation stage, the empirical model developed the two in distinctly different stages. Three factors contributed to this early development of legitimacy: Money, the political consultant, and opinion leadership. Newspaper comments such as "Sturdivant is causing people to rethink...big bucks to challenge frontrunners"[39] suggested the impact of Sturdivant's financial backing. Similarly, financial resources enabled Sturdivant to hire a well known professional consultant, thus adding to his legitimacy. Early in the campaign, in an article on potential candidate Evelyn Gandy, one columnist noted that Gandy would have to hire a top quality consultant to compete with those already in the race for Sturdivant and Attorney General Bill Allain.[40] The columnist concluded "This year's race is shaping up as a battle of the political consultants."[41]

Further, the reporting of his support among opinion leaders, extended the perception of Sturdivant as a legitimate candidate. An early organizational meeting saw a wide segment of leaders

represented,[42] and early rallies were said to be attended by folks driving pick-ups as well as Mercedes.[43]

During this stage, Squier sought to introduce his candidate as a businessman with expertise to handle big problems. Sturdivant's two page opening press release began, "Glendora businessman, Mike Sturdivant, pledging to put his business know-how to work to attract jobs and upgrade education, has announced his candidacy for governor."[44] In a two-day series of press conferences through the state, Sturdivant stated that "the only issue...is which candidate can do more than talk about better jobs and better education."[45] The desired impression was that of an aggressive, competent businessman who could and would act to ensure better economic and educational conditions in the state.

The press releases, however, met with some difficulty. The announcement, as it appeared in the papers and was picked up by political columnists, conveyed a slightly different image. The news article in the Clarion-Ledger (Jackson, Mississippi) described the "55 year-old planter and hotel chain owner who is entering his first political race."[46] While the substance of the story conformed to the press release, the terminology represented important differences for the Mississippi political climate (particularly the difference between "Glendora businessman and farmer" and "planter and hotel chain owner"). "Planter" represents an elitist image palatable neither to the general Mississippi population nor to the non-planter population (large black component) of the Mississippi Delta. While articles and columns contributed to name recognition and to a perception of legitimacy

for Sturdivant's race, descriptive terminology such as Delta planter,"[47] "wealthy businessman-farmer,"[48] and "Glendora planter-big businessman,"[49] could have undermined the foundation planned for the first stage. The impression of competence was conveyed, but the concomitant labels could have been a handicap by tying him to an elite Delta group.

Identification. The foundation ads achieved the identification goal, and expanded upon the legitimacy goal. During this stage, identification ratings increased to 76 percent.[50] But there were some negative reactions to the ads.

First, there were responses to Sturdivant as a non-photogenic candidate. Columnist Wayne Weidie noted, "I have never seen so many observers dismiss Sturdivant's chances because of his looks."[51] Second, the response to the ads did not meet Squier's required criteria of interest. One columinist described the ads as ...lackluster television commercials which offer so much 'stability' that audiences are falling asleep."[52] Third, the ads themselves became a campaign issue, perhaps because the messages themselves did not generate much discussion. As a result, the conversational agenda related to the ads focused on their quantity, not their message. One political cartoon caption pictured a pollster reporting to Sturdivant, "Well, Mr. Sturdivant, our latest poll shows that there is one group that really likes you--TV ad salesmen."[53]

Competency. The competency stage of the Sturdivant campaign did use the three week emphasis on manuscripts. Each week followed the planned format of the ideal model, campaigns anchored by the

public release of manuscripts dealing with issues. Their function became twofold, demonstration of competency and agenda setting. This effort was largely successful, as demonstrated by media responses. During this time an analysis of newspaper coverage statewide indicated that Sturdivant was receiving 2.5 times as much coverage in the media as were the other candidates.[54]

However, one aspect of this stage did not correspond to the preplanned campaign model. This was a rhetorical attack on one of the opponents, Bill Allain, an attack aimed at combatting increased popularity demonstrated in the campaign polls. The television ads questioned outside income received by Allain while he was an Assistant Attorney General in 1966. The ads resulted in considerable media attention, including a charge of "mudslinging."[55] But the attack was consistent with Squier's concept of campaigning. He has said, "Sometimes ...you have to attack your opponent and we've done that, especially when the opponent's record is vulnerable to attack."[56]

However, the attack element in the Sturdivant campaign appears as a tangent to the campaign model. Thus, Squier's foundation stage involved a projection of Sturdivant as a "businessman, not a politician"[57] and a manager with a competency for a wide variety of fields.[58] But none of the adjectives associated with Sturdivant during the foundation stage were associated with "attack" or "fighter." Thus, the attack mode could have generated responses that were inconsistent with voters' previous images of Sturdivant.

Issue Development. According to Squier, the final stage of a campaign must develop and complete the story of the candidate.

Consistent with this approach, during the final three weeks of the campaign, Sturdivant continued to present his position that professional politicians had failed, and to proclaim his ability to implement educational reform. However, he also addressed a number of other issues, including support for the elderly and medical support.[59]

In Squier's approach, development and completion of the campaign story would result in a final "explosion" of support as closure of the campaign was attained. "It's going to be just like the Lautenberg campaign," said Squier operative Carter Eskew. "We developed slowly in the polls until the message got through, and then there was an explosion of support in the final weeks. It's going to happen here too."[60]

There was some support for this argument. During most of the campaign, Sturdivant had consistently ranked third in a campaign that required at least a second place finish to qualify for a run-off. However, in the week prior to the election date, Sturdivant's poll indicated a major shift of voters toward him, resulting in a tie for second place.[61] This movement was confirmed by an independent poll showing the same results.[62]

However, a new development followed release of the poll data. Both of the other major candidates attacked Sturdivant. Gandy's attack was directed at a "sexist" commercial of Sturdivant's aimed at attracting female voters.[63] And Allain's attack was aimed at Sturdivant for "mudslinging" ("Mike Sturdivant, stop slinging mud.")[64] In addition, the Sturdivant campaign appeared lackluster during this stage, particularly during the final week. As one

commentator noted, "It was almost like his campaign people were publicly searching for an identity."[65]

Sturdivant also lost the media agenda during this stage. He retained media support, getting 13 newspaper endorsements out of the 16 making such endorsements. But coverage became more equally distributed among the three major candidates, and the agendas of the other candidates frequently took precedence. Thus the reaction function of the third stage seemed to hinder control at this point. And, this may have been reflected in the final vote. On August 2, 1983, Mike Sturdivant finished third in a field of five candidates, approximately 90,000 votes behind second place Allain.

DISCUSSION

Based upon this study, the following principles appear relevant to the role of the political consultant as rhetor.

Legitimacy. The professional political consultant can provide instant legitimacy to a campaign, resulting perhaps in more press coverage and inclusion of the candidate in the voter's decisional agenda. Thus, a consultant's association with a campaign is in itself a rhetorical act. This concept is supported by Barnes, who noted that consultants "are able to make candidate's look credible just by being hired."[66] In the Sturdivant campaign, this impact was demonstrated in the separation of the legitimacy and identification stages of the campaign.

Agenda Maintenance. The primary strategic goal of the consultant's efforts appears to be maintenance of the issue agenda of the media. This is demonstrated in the Sturdivant campaign through the efforts of the consultant to emphasis portions of the

developmental message at preplanned stages in the campaign. Thus, as Becker has noted, "the existence of campaign consultants ...attests to the degree to which the media are driving campaigns. Candidates need experts who understand the media so they can maintain some degree of control of their campaign."[67] Thus, the preplanned developmental stages of the Sturdivant campaign represented the consultant's plan for providing information to the public via the media. And, the devices used for release of the information (books and manuscripts) provided techniques to enhance media coverage of the messages. In this function, the consultant's role is to make recommendations as to the degree to which and the ways in which the campaign is adjusted to accommodate the media.[68] Thus, the consultant's role in agenda maintenance may override the corresponding function of message construction.

The Consultant as Issue. On an additional level of campaign analysis, the consultant or his work can develop as a meta-campaign issue that may distract from the overall campaign strategy. As Barnes noted, "political reporters concentrate on the ebb and flow of consultants."[69] But, as an artifact of this process, the candidate's message may get less attention. This was demonstrated in the Sturdivant campaigns when the number and frequency of the television ads become an issue detracting from the messages they were intended to convey. And, simultaneously, when the consultant's work becomes a campaign issue, the meta-campaign can replace issues in the media's agenda and thus hinder the consultant's function of agenda maintenance.

CONCLUSION

While Squier's strategy is presented here as an individual approach to campaigning, some elements are common to other consultants. Like Squier, most consultants voice the need for adaptive messages reflective of the candidate. Thus Shadegg says, "At the outset of any campaign...this question must be answered: Who is this candidate we are asking the voters to support."[70]

Further, the "Single Vision" theme is frequently voiced, arguing for consultants to have access to the rhetorical strategies of the campaign.[71] This position implies that at least some consultants may view their rhetorical role as an expressive one, i.e., identifying and defining characteristics of the candidate and expressing these in symbols that relate to the voters. However, further study is needed to distinguish the identification and definition roles of this expressive function. To what extent, do consultants identify a candidate's personal strengths and to what extent do consultants impose their own definitions onto the expressive image? To what extent are the consultant's rhetorical strategies influenced by the personal strengths of the candidate as compared to the perceived desires of the voting public? And, to what extent are the messages related to those personal strengths related to media receptivity of the messages? These questions probably vary with individual campaigns, and the resulting dual roles are identifiable in this study by the cross pressures of (1) strategy planning that focuses on identifying a candidate's personal strengths, and (2) actual strategic moves during the campaign development that are based on poll results. But scholars

need better techniques for making such judgments and more analysis of the process of campaign strategy development.

Still, the academic investigation of consultants as rhetors is currently too limited to make conclusive statements. But, given the increased importance of consultants in the campaign process, future studies must expand upon knowledge in this area.

FOOTNOTES

[1]See, for example, Leonard C. Shyles, "Defining the Issues of a Presidential Election from Televised Political Spot Advertisements," Journal of Broadcasting, 27 (Fall, 1983), 333-344.

[2]M. T. Barclay, "Distaff Campaigning in the 1964 Presidential Election," Central States Speech Journal, 21 (1970), p. 117.

[3]Larry Powell, "Strategies in a Statewide Secondary Executive Race: A Case Study," Georgia Speech Communication Journal, 6 (Fall, 1974), 18-30; and James T. Kitchens and Betsey Stiteler, "Challenge to the Rule of Minimum Effects: A Cast Study of the In . . . Man-Out Man Strategy," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 44 (Winter, 1979), 176-190.

[4]Larry J. Sabato, "A Survey of the Costs and Services of Political Consultants," Campaigns & Elections, 2 (Winter, 1982) 42-46; see also, Larry J. Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections (Basic Books, 1981).

[5]Sabato, p. 45.

[6]Robert Agranoff, "Campaign Management: Benefits of the Professional Approach," Campaigns & Elections, 1 (Spring, 1980), p. 47.

[7]Agranoff, p. 52.

[8]"Interview: Robert Squier's Media Miracles in Dixie," Campaigns & Elections, 1 (Summer, 1980), 29-42.

[9]Squier, p. 30.

[10]Squier, p. 36.

[11]Squier, p. 36.

[12]Mark L. Hickson, III, "The Open-Systems Model Auditing the Effectiveness of Organizational Communication," Journal of Business Communication, 10 (Spring, 1973), 7-14.

[13]Squier, p. 36.

[14]Squier, p. 34.

[15]Squier, p. 34.

[16]Squier, p. 34.

[17]Squier, p. 37.

[18]Squier, p. 34.

[19]Squier, p. 37.

[20]"Conference Examiners Upset Finish," Camden Courier Post, 30 November, 1982, p. 1.

[21]Squier, p. 37.

[22]Squier, p. 37.

[23]Charles Larson.

[24]Sturdivant Press Release.

[25]Jack Elliot, "Evelyn Gandy's Just Itching to Show Off Her New Running Shoes," Clarion-Ledger/Jackson Daily News, March 6, 1983, 3J.

[26]Elliot, p. 3J.

[27]Squier, p. 32.

[28]Squier, p. 33.

[29]Sturdivant Campaign Poll, April, 1983.

[30]Sturdivant Campaign Press Release.

[31]Robert Squier, Speech in Jackson Mississippi, June, 1983.

[32]Mike Sturdivant, A Jobs Plan for Mississippi, Sturdivant for Governor Campaign, June, 1983.

[33]Mike Sturdivant, Education in Mississippi, Sturdivant for Governor Campaign, June, 1983.

[34]Sturdivant, Mississippi on the Move.

[35]Steven Shadegg, The New How to Win an Election (New York: Taplinger, 1972), p.

[36]Hal Malchow, personal conversation with one of the authors, May 12, 1983.

[37]Squier, p. 31.

[38]Squier, p. 34.

[39] Wayne Weidie, "He Can't Run, But Winter's Aides Might Still Try to Ride on His Coattails," Clarion-Ledger/Jackson Daily News, March 27, 1983, 3G.

[40]Paul Pittman, "Evelyn Gandy May Have to Break Down and Hire a Media Whiz," Clarion-Ledger/Jackson Daily News, March 27, 1983, 3G; see also, Paul Pittman, "Candidates Must Have Up to Date Campaigns," The Reflector, March 1, 1983, p. 4.

[41]Pittman, p. 3G.

[42]John Emmerich, "Mike Sturdivant's Dark Horse is Beginning to Look Alot Brighter," Clarion-Ledger/Jackson Daily News, Sunday, February 13, 1983, p. 3F.

[43]Emmerich, p. 3F.

[44]Sturdivant Campaign Press Release.

[45]Sturdivant Campaign Press Release.

[46]Fred Anklam, Jr., "Sturdivant Enters Race for Governor," Clarion-Ledger, March 22, 1983, 1A.

[47]Paul Pittman, "Is Sturdivant Really Not a Politician?" Clarion-Ledger/Jackson Daily News, March 10, 1983, 3F.

[48]Wayne Weidie, March 27, 1983.

[49]Wayne Weidie, "Bramlett Won't Stay Waiting in the Wings for Long," Clarion-Ledger/Jackson Daily News, March 17, 1983, 3I.

[50]"Tabular Report: Mississippi," Campaign Poll Results, Hamilton and Staff, Chevy Chase, Maryland, June 1983, p. 1.

[51]Wayne Weidie, "The Political Scene," The Political Scene Syndicate, May 21, 1983, p. 4.

[52]James Young, "Young--Sizing Up the Democratic Field," The Commercial Appeal, May 22, 1983, G-2; see also Fred Anklam, Jr., "Sturdivant Defends Media Campaign," Clarion-Ledger, June 9, 1983, p. 1B.

[53]Ricky Nobile, Cartoon, Sentinal Star, June 7, 1983.

[54]Sturdivant Clipping Analysis, Sturdivant for Governor Campaign, June, 1983.

[55]Allain Campaign Ad, Allain for Governor Committee, Jackson, Mississippi, 1983; see also, James Young, "Campaign Twists Erasing Blandness," The Commercial Appeal, June 16, 1983, 16-I.

[56]Squier, p. 33.

[57]John Emmerich, "Mike Sturdivant's Dark Horse is Beginning to Look a Lot Brighter," Clarion-Ledger/Jackson Daily News, February 13, 1983, p. 3F.

[58]Jack Elliot, "State is Special to Sturdivant Media Man," Clarion-Ledger/Jackson Daily News, Sunday, February 20, 1983, p. 1-B.

[59]Mike Sturdivant, Mississippi on the Move.

[60]Personal Conversation with Carter Eskew, Jackson, Mississippi, July 23, 1983.

[61]Sturdivant Campaign Poll, Hamilton and Associates, Chevy Chase, Maryland, July 1983.

[62]Mississippi Election Campaign Poll, WJTV-TV, Jackson, Mississippi, July, 1983.

[63]Tom Oppel, "Candidate Must Be Sold on TV," Clarion-Ledger, September 25, 1983, p. 1F.

[64]Allain Campaign Ad, Allain for Governor Committee, Jackson, Mississippi, July, 1983.

[65]Quoted in Oppel, September 25, 1983, p. 4F.

[66]Fred Barnes, "The Myth of Political Consultants" The New Republic, June 16, 1986, p. 19.

[67]Samuel L. Becker, "Locating the Unum Among the Pluribus," Paper for the International Communication Association, Chicago, May 1986, p. 7.

[68]Becker, p. 7.

[69]Barnes, p. 19.

[70]Shadegg, p. 46.

[71]See Oppel, September 25, 1983, p. 1F, 4F.